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Abstract 
In this paper a framework is proposed for conceptualising ‘fullest potential’ towards 
which, according to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), children’s 
education should be directed (Article 29). Children’s development to their fullest 
potential is linked explicitly to their right to a standard of living adequate for their 
development (Article 27). The paper argues that focus on ‘fullest potential’ as a 
human rights issue exposes a tension between the rights of children, the obligations of 
parents to their children, and the obligations of the state to support all children’s 
development.  
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To Their Fullest Potential? Conceptualising the 
Adequacy of Children's Living Standards for their 
Development  
1  In troduction 
What is fullest potential and why is it important? Speeches on child wellbeing and 
development by politicians, and policy statements by governments are liberally 
sprinkled with the phrase.1 Sometimes the concept of ‘fullest potential’ is left open-
ended and undefined. Often it is linked to a narrower set of accomplishments, such as 
educational achievement in childhood and economic productivity in adulthood. 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (United Nations, 1989), states that 
children have the right to ‘a standard of living adequate for their physical, mental, 
spiritual, moral and social development’ (Article 27), and that the education of the 
child shall be directed towards the development of their ‘personality, talents, and 
mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential.’ (Article 29). In this paper, these 
two Articles are interpreted as meaning that children have the right to a living 
standard adequate for their development to their fullest potential. This is not a radical 
interpretation of the CRC; it merely expresses what policy documents in many 
countries express – that a child’s background should not influence her destination in 
life, and that the role of public education is to maximise outcomes for all children.2   
1 For example, President Barack Obama stated in a video address on 13 March 2010: “Unless we take 
action — unless we step up — there are countless children who will never realize their full talent 
and potential. I don't accept that future for them. And I don't accept that future for the United States 
of America.”  
2 See for example the following Australian and US examples: MCEETYA, Melbourne Declaration on 
Educational Goals for Young Australians,  Carlton, Vic., Ministerial Council on Education 
Employment Training and Youth Affairs, December 2008, 
http://www.mceecdya.edu.au/verve/_resources/National_Declaration_on_the_Educational_Goals_f
or_Young_Australians.pdf; U.S. Department of Education, Blueprint for Reform: The 
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The concept of ‘fullest potential’ has not received a great deal of attention to date in 
the literature on child rights. This is perhaps not surprising, given that it is only in 
recent years that international bodies, and indeed academics, have begun to turn their 
attention on some of the normative aspects of human rights, such as the right to 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health (Committee on the Rights of 
the Child, 2013), or the meaning of ‘maximum resources’ in the context of economic, 
social and cultural rights (Johnstone and Ámundadóttir, 2011; Nolan, 2013). The aim 
of this paper is to make a contribution towards extending this literature through 
examination of the concept of ‘fullest potential’, and its relationship to children’s 
living standards. This suggests a number of challenges. First, if a child’s living 
standard should be sufficient to enable her to develop to her fullest potential, then 
what does this imply for how living standards are defined? Second, how can 
‘development to fullest potential’ be defined in a way that both does justice to the 
aspirations inherent in the term, and acknowledges real-world challenges associated 
with its realisation? Third, what is the role of the state and of parents as duty bearers 
whose obligation it is to secure children’s access to their development to their fullest 
potential? It is argued that while the goal of every child attaining the right to 
development to their fullest potential may appear somewhat utopian, sustained focus 
on this goal will bring to the fore the choices that society needs to make if it is to do 
justice to all its children in defining practical and achievable goals in the space of 
child development. These choices are equally relevant in all societies, in both the 
majority and minority worlds. 
Reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act,  Washington, DC, United States 
Department of Education, March 2010, http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/blueprint/ 
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The paper is organised as follows. Section  2 describes the CRC, focusing in particular 
on articles relevant to children’s right to an adequate standard of living, and to their 
right to development to their fullest potential. The definition of living standards under 
three different approaches – material welfare, social exclusion, and capabilities – is 
discussed in Section  3. This Section concludes that the capability approach offers the 
greatest potential as a framework for defining living standards that are adequate for 
children’s development to their fullest potential. Section  4 elaborates further on the 
meaning of adequate living standards for children’s development to their fullest 
potential, given heterogeneity in individual needs, characteristics and preferences. 
Section  5 then considers the feasibility in policy terms of every child attaining their 
fullest potential, given that parents are key (but hardly unbiased) duty bearers for their 
children: their actions have the dual function of constantly pushing the boundaries of 
fullest potential, while at the same resisting moves to equalise outcomes among 
children. Section  6 concludes. 
2  C hildren’s  Ri ghts  
The CRC has a dual purpose: first, to extend the fundamental human rights recognised 
for adults to children so as to challenge assumptions about children based on their 
age, and the exclusion and exploitation to which this can give rise; and second, to call 
attention to children’s particular status with specific vulnerabilities, interests and 
entitlements (White, 2002). In this Section, attention is focused on just two articles of 
the CRC, Article 27 (concerning the child’s living standards) and Article 29 
(concerning the purpose of her education). Article 27.1 states:  
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States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard of 
living adequate for the child's physical, mental, spiritual, moral and 
social development.  
Craven, writing on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, notes that the lack of clarity in the term ‘adequate standard of living’ has 
resulted in a right “which appears to have little independent substance.”(Craven, 
1995, p.293) This is undoubtedly the case. It is other rights (to life, survival, health 
education, etc.) that appear to ultimately point towards what an adequate standard of 
living might entail. According to Bowers Andrews, Article 27 suggests the need to 
conceptualise the child’s living standards in terms of her whole self and her 
development, and not simply her physical needs. “In effect, the UN has issued a 
challenge to nations through Article 27 that requires them to discover what conditions 
are adequate and necessary for their children’s development and to secure, to the 
extent possible, those conditions for each child.”(Bowers Andrews, 1999, pp.7-8)   
There are a number of resources that can feed into achievement of child development, 
among which family and parental resources are one element, as Article 27.2 states. 
Another important element is the resources of the state that are either directly invested 
in the child, or invested through the parents – this is the focus of Article 27.3, and 
more generally of Article 4, which obliges states parties to undertake economic 
measures “to the maximum extent of their available resources.” This paper shall argue 
that the responsibility of both parents and the state for the adequacy of children’s 
living standards is at the same time necessary and problematic. The right to an 
adequate standard of living, moreover, can only be judged in terms of its adequacy 
according to the outcome – the child’s development – that it achieves. Article 27.1 
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clearly states as much. We can only therefore truly know if a child’s standard of living 
is adequate if they are developing towards, as Article 29.1(a) puts it, their fullest 
potential. 
Article 29.1(a) of the CRC states that “States Parties agree that the education of the 
child shall be directed to: (a) The development of the child’s personality, talents and 
mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential.” This Article builds on Article 
26.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Education shall be directed to 
the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.” If achievement of ‘fullest potential’ is to be 
a realistic goal of policy, then it cannot remain a vague aspiration. Education in the 
context of Article 29 is usually broadly interpreted, as the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child (2001, paragraph 2) makes clear in stating that education needs to be seen as 
much more than formal schooling, and should include a broad range of experiences 
and learning processes which enable children to develop fully in the society in which 
they live. 
In contrast to the concept of education, the concept of ‘fullest potential’ does not 
appear to have been given a great deal of attention by human rights scholars. This is 
perhaps not surprising. Rachel Hodgkin and Peter Newell (2007) suggest that the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has not been able to examine these more 
normative issues, and has focused instead on statistical measures of drop-out rates, 
repeat classes and international research on school-going children’s achievement in 
mathematics, science and literature. However Thomas Pogge’s (2008) understanding 
of human rights as moral rights provides a useful starting point for the consideration 
of ‘fullest potential’. First, he differentiates between non-fulfilment and under-
6 
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fulfilment of rights, moving away from the language of ‘rights violations’ (Chapman, 
1996), with its implied preoccupation with failure to reach minimum standards. 
Second, Pogge explicitly links the setting of thresholds against which the fulfilment of 
rights is judged to the social costs associated with achievement of those thresholds – 
in other words, society must make a judgement about the weight it gives to ‘fullest 
potential’ as a goal for children’s development, and the price it is prepared to pay to 
achieve this goal. Making deliberations on societal goals open and explicit constitutes 
in itself an important step towards human rights fulfilment (Sen, 2004). Open 
consideration of the price society is prepared to pay for children’s achievement of 
their fullest potential shifts debate on children’s living standards and development 
onto the issue of inequalities within societies, and between them, and it is here that 
debates on fullest potential can make a contribution towards creating better conditions 
for all children’s development.  
3  App roach es to  def ining adequac y in  living 
s tandards 
It is probably fair to say that debates on the meaning of an adequate standard of living 
have not usually taken place within a human rights framework. This is apparent, for 
example, from discussion of the phrase during the travaux preparatoires for the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Craven, 1995). 
Where living standards have been considered in the context of human rights, concern 
has not tended to be with ‘living standards’ in the abstract, but with low living 
standards - poverty, deprivation, exclusion and disadvantage (Office of the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights, 2004). As Gertrude Himmelfarb (1984) argues, 
‘poverty’ as it is currently conceived is a relatively modern concept arising from 
social and economic dislocation that followed the processes of enclosure of land, 
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industrialisation and urbanisation, first in Britain, and later in other European 
countries, during the 18th and 19th centuries. More recently, dissatisfaction with the 
conceptualisation of poverty purely in material terms has given rise to a number of 
alternative, partially overlapping, ideas, for example, underclass (Murray, 1984, 
2012), disadvantage (Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007), exclusion (Rogers, 1995), and 
capabilities (Sen, 2009). Indeed, over the past two decades, debates on the meaning of 
poverty have greatly influenced debates on human rights (Office of the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights, 2004; Pogge, 2008). Three ideas have had a 
particular influence – the material welfare approach which focuses on material 
resources,3 the social exclusion approach which focuses on processes and 
relationships, and the capability approach which focuses on agency and freedom. 
Living standards are discussed in the context of these three approaches below.4 
Living standards and material welfare 
The characterisation of living standards in purely material terms has a long history, 
and what is termed here the material welfare approach has developed sophisticated 
tools over several decades to examine the phenomenon (Redmond, 2013, 
forthcoming). In essence, the material welfare approach has sought to measure and 
compare household, family and individual material resources (income, wealth, 
possessions, access to services, etc.) as indicators of living standards, and to construct 
thresholds representing the cut-off between ‘adequate’ and ‘inadequate’ living 
3 Sometimes seen in developing countries as a ‘basic needs’ approach; see F. Stewart, 'Basic Needs 
Strategies, Human-Rights, and the Right to Development'. Human Rights Quarterly 11 (3) 
(1989):347-374. 
4 All three approaches are discussed in more detail in G. Redmond, 'Poverty and Social Exclusion'. In 
Handbook of Child Well-being, A. Ben-Arieh, I. Frones, F. Casas and J. Korbin, ed. (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2013, forthcoming). Original edition, ibid..  
8 
 
                                                 
                  Fullest potential 
standards (this is a gross simplification of a vast and complex literature). Adoption of 
a material welfare approach suggests that a child’s right to an adequate standard of 
living could be seen for example in terms of rights to an adequate level of income, or 
to an adequate level of consumption. Either way, the right refers to the (objectively 
measurable) actual income or consumption level, not the utility, welfare or outcomes 
gained from them (Atkinson, 1989).  
Moreover, as the focus shifts to material resources as ends in themselves, the 
relationship between the adequacy threshold (measured in money, for instance) and 
actual outcomes for which the material resources are intended tend to be under-
specified (Ruggeri Laderchi, Saith, and Stewart, 2003). The adequacy threshold 
becomes a goal in itself. An example is the World Bank’s ‘dollar a day’ poverty 
threshold, now incorporated in the Millennium Development Goals. What a life lived 
at this threshold can achieve is secondary, if it is considered at all. 
Living standards and social exclusion 
If living standards under the material welfare approach are associated with the level of 
material resources at one’s disposal, living standards under the social exclusion 
approach are more concerned with participation in practices and activities considered 
customary in the society in which one lives. In other words, the social exclusion 
approach is more concerned with poverty as a relationship, especially between the 
‘included’ and the ‘excluded’, with the latter to a large extent experiencing their 
predicaments as a result of actions of the former; that is, agency is explicitly 
recognised (Atkinson, 1998; Lister, 2004). Unlike material poverty, exclusion is seen 
as a process as well as a state, and is multidimensional in form. That is, it is 
concerned with exclusion across a range of domains in addition to material welfare, 
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such as employment, health and disability, racial discrimination, and access to 
services, etc. However, applications of this approach do not usually distinguish 
between resources (money, for example) and outcomes (such as a child’s 
developmental or educational achievements) – both can be indicators of, or ‘risk 
factors’ for exclusion. There is nothing inherent in the social exclusion approach to 
determine the ordering of these risk factors. 
On the other hand, while there is nothing inherent in the material welfare approach 
that can point to the meaning of ‘adequacy’ (it has to be exogenously imposed), it has 
a fairly clear meaning within the social exclusion approach: adequacy equates with 
participation in activities and practices that are customary in the community where a 
person lives. In other words, adequacy in the space of social exclusion can be equated 
with some measure of the average, or defined in relation to the average. To some 
extent, adequacy can be a matter of subjective judgement, but it usually also involves 
a considerable degree of objective measurement (Barry, 1998; Levitas, Pantazis, 
Fahmy et al., 2007; Lister, 2004). 
Living standards and capabilities 
The capabilities approach, proposed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, can be 
seen in large part as a critique of the standard utility-oriented approaches that focus 
purely on income and commodities as the space for policy concerns (Nussbaum, 
2000; Sen, 1987, 1999, 2009). Whereas material welfare is about a stock or flow of 
countable resources or commodities, capabilities are about our opportunities to make 
use of possessions and other things in order to lead a life which we have reason to 
value. Capabilities are those things that are intrinsically valuable, including some 
things that an individual may not explicitly desire (Deneulin, 2002; Saito, 2003). Like 
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the social exclusion approach, the capabilities approach is multidimensional or 
pluralist – concerned with a number of freedoms that cannot necessarily be 
aggregated into a single index. This is fundamentally different from the ‘monist’ 
tradition that is characteristic of much of the material welfare approach with its focus 
(for the most part) on money, which is eminently aggregable (Wolff and de-Shalit, 
2007). In this sense, capabilities analysts appear to resist defining anybody as 
‘capable’, just like social exclusion analysts are reluctant to define anybody as 
‘excluded’ (Burchardt, Le Grand, and Piachaud, 2002; Sen, 1985). Material welfare 
moreover is instrumentally important, but capabilities, Sen argues, are intrinsically 
important. Factors other than economic resources can influence these intrinsically 
important outcomes. Because people have different skills, characteristics and 
attributes, and live in different situations, they may need different levels and types of 
resources (both material and non-material) in order to achieve a functioning that is 
associated with a given set of capabilities. 
While the material welfare approach sees utility or welfare as the implicit target for 
the generation of income or the consumption of commodities, the capabilities 
approach is not concerned with utility, but with freedoms, as expressed in capabilities, 
and realised in functionings. Ingrid Robeyns describes the relationship between 
commodities, capabilities and functionings graphically in Figure 1. Commodities 
comprise a range of goods and services that act as inputs for the achievement of 
capabilities. Each commodity in the commodity bundle has a particular set of 
characteristics that define the commodity’s usefulness in terms of enabling freedoms 
in a given capability set. However, the usefulness of the vector of commodities 
depends also on the personal characteristics of the individual and the characteristics of 
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her living environment – these can fundamentally alter the usefulness of a given 
vector of commodities for the enabling of a particular capability. For example, high 
speed internet positively transforms the usefulness of computers as tools for learning, 
while lack of access to electricity negatively transforms their usefulness. Capabilities 
analysts argue that policies should focus primarily on enhancing capabilities or 
freedoms. That is, it is the job of the policymaker acting in the capabilities space to 
ensure that each individual has fundamental freedoms that are considered to be 
intrinsically important, taking full account of the personal, social and environmental 
factors that might otherwise present obstacles to the realisation of those freedoms. 
Figure 1: The relationship between commodities, capabilities and functionings in 
Sen’s capability approach 
Market production
Non-market
production
Income
Transfers in kind
Vector of 
Commodities
(characteristics)
Personal, social and 
environmental 
conversion factors
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functionings)
(constrained)
Choice
Single vector 
of achieved 
functionings
Means to achieve Freedom to achieve Achievement
Capability 
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Different 
ideas of 
the Good 
Life
 
Source: Robeyns (2003), p.12 
 
What people do with these freedoms is essentially their own choice, but it is 
nonetheless expected that the actual choices that people make – their functionings – 
can be seen as indicators of the freedoms that they have, since freedoms themselves 
are difficult to observe. Therefore, a child who does well at school might be assumed 
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to possess capabilities in the space of the intrinsically important dimension of 
education, and by extension that she has sufficient resources or means to function in 
this space. 
4  Livin g standa rds and fu llest  po tentia l  
Of the three approaches to the definition of living standards (material welfare, social 
exclusion, capabilities) discussed here, the capabilities approach is the only one that 
attempts to directly relate the means to achieve to actual achievements, taking account 
of social and environmental characteristics. With the material welfare approach, 
concern is just with material living standards, and any relationship to other outcomes 
is implicit. With the social exclusion approach, there is no clear ordering of material 
and other outcomes. With the capabilities approach, material welfare is one of several 
inputs to intrinsically important functionings. It is this key property that makes the 
capabilities approach especially useful in considering the adequacy of children’s 
living standards for their development to their fullest potential. 
Note that many capabilities analysts take a  perfectionist approach in considering what 
capabilities or freedoms mean in concrete terms: that is, they sometimes assume that 
there is a set of essential capabilities towards which children’s development should be 
directed, in the sense that they promote children’s humanity – those things that make 
humans different from other life-forms (Deneulin, 2002; Hurka, 1996). Nussbaum’s 
well-known list of capabilities could be seen as one such vector of essential 
capabilities (Nussbaum, 2003). While many of the examples of achievement in this 
article relate to ‘the capability to learn’, or ‘doing well at school’ as a functioning 
within that capability space, it should be assumed as noted above that education to 
one’s fullest potential encompasses much more than school based learning outcomes.  
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Development to Fullest Potential 
To summarise, the aim of this paper is to establish a means of defining children’s 
right to a standard of living that is adequate for them to develop to their fullest 
potential. If an adequate standard of living represents rights fulfilment in that it gives 
the child the possibility to achieve her fullest potential, then an inadequate standard of 
living represents the counterfactual of rights non-fulfilment in that it deprives the 
child of the possibility to achieve her fullest potential. Of the three approaches to the 
conceptualisation of living standards discussed in Section  3 above, only the 
capabilities approach can incorporate a truly normative conceptualisation of fullest 
potential, in that there is no upper limit on what potential can be achieved. In the 
material welfare approach, any definitions of ‘fullest potential’ would have to be 
exogenously imposed. In the social exclusion approach, attainment of fullest potential 
is constrained by community standards for participation – the attainment of these 
implies the attainment of fullest potential in this view. The social exclusion approach 
cannot easily accommodate notions of attainment that surpass community standards 
(although the approach is not wholly inimical to the societal goal of raising average 
community standards).  
With the capabilities approach, the process of defining a normative conceptualisation 
of fullest potential is feasible (Sen, 2002), but nonetheless inhibited by some 
challenges. The first concerns the definition a standard of living that can achieve the 
most optimal outcomes: what elements, and how much of them, would constitute this 
standard of living? While leading a life one has reason to value could be judged, as 
the social exclusion approach suggests, in terms of a community, national or global 
standard, it is possible with the capabilities approach to go further than this: the 
standard need not be tied to what is considered customary, but could be related to 
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what is considered achievable, or potentially better than customary. At the level of the 
individual, optimal outcomes are difficult to determine. Instead, it is proposed that 
what is achievable, or optimal, is what children with the highest living standards 
manage to achieve. The implicit counterfactual is that children who do not have the 
highest living standards cannot achieve to their fullest potential. 
Living standards and personal characteristics 
The focus on living standards suggests a further challenge in the context of the 
capabilities approach. It implies that policy effort be concentrated not on capabilities 
themselves, but on the distribution of resources for the achievement of capabilities. 
The stylised assumption here is that achievement of an outcome O for child i in any 
given capability set (to lead a life she has reason to value) is the function of a set of 
largely unchanging and randomly assigned personal characteristics Z, and a living 
standard L comprising a wide range of material and non-material elements (including 
parental love and care, education provision, community services, etc.), so that  
( )iii ZxLfO |=      (1) 
where Zi represents those personal characteristics that govern child i’s innate 
preferences and skills that will determine that she is better at languages than at maths, 
or prefers woodwork to philosophy – this is what produces ‘natural’ diversity or 
horizontal inequalities between children, to use Pogge’s (2002) terminology. While 
what counts as ‘natural’ diversity is clearly open to debate, the assumption here is that 
at least some diversity is natural. We cannot all be equally good at languages, 
mathematics, metalwork, sports and artistic expression (or equally desire to be). For 
each outcome O there is a different bundle and weighting of goods and services 
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making up living standard L. Therefore, the characteristics of these goods and services 
are implicitly incorporated in L.  
Zi also incorporates a conversion factor – x – which can be seen as the price 
associated with supporting children who have a socially recognised characteristic 
(such as a physical disability). This allows for differential content and weighting of 
goods and services that make up Li so that children with the recognised characteristic 
have the same capability to reach their fullest potential in Oi as children without that 
characteristic (Burchardt and Zaidi, 2005; Sen, 1992). For the former children, x>1; 
for other children, x=1. There are no circumstances where x<1, since this would 
suggest only allowing resources for a child to achieve below her fullest potential, 
which is inconsistent with her rights (Sen, 2002). The important point here is that the 
condition is socially recognised. The alternative possibility, that all deficits are 
equated with non-fulfilment of human rights, suggests that all children should have 
the freedom to achieve equally in all endeavours, and also that the end-product should 
be sameness, rather than diversity, where, irrespective of children’s diverse Zs, there 
would ideally be no distribution of any outcomes.5  This paper is in accord with Pogge 
(2008) to the extent that such a state of affairs is not even theoretically desirable. A 
midway point could be to suggest certain key capabilities where the aim of policy 
might be that all children should achieve to equally high standards. But as Richard 
Arneson (1989) says, which ones? Even then, is full equality in outcomes truly 
desirable or achievable? 
5 Some see this as integral to the Capabilities approach; see S. Berges, 'Why the Capability Approach is 
Justified'. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (1) (2007):16-25, H. Brighouse and E. Unterhalter, 
'Primary goods Versus Capabilities: Considering the Debate in relation to Equalities in Education'. 
In Capabilities - Handlungsbefahigung und Verwirklichungschancen in der 
Erziehungswissenschaft, H.-U. Otto and H. Ziegler, ed. (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2008). Original 
edition.  
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The argument proposed here is that greater equality in O can only be achieved on the 
foot of greater equity in L. This characterisation of O as the product of L given Z can 
perhaps be seen as analogous to Gary Becker’s (1981) characterisation of children’s 
economic outcomes as the product of two factors – genetic endowment that parents 
pass onto their children, and resources that parents invest in their children. It is also 
perhaps analogous to studies in developmental psychology of intrinsic and extrinsic 
models of the influence of parental socio-economic status on child development and 
outcomes (Conger and Donnellan, 2007). Here it is assumed that at any given 
standard of living L, children will experience a range of outcomes O, and that their 
position in this range is determined by their personal characteristics Z. It is also 
assumed that these innate characteristics and preferences are not associated with prior 
living standards (in other words, they somehow describe the child ‘in a state of 
nature’). However, it is also recognised that in practice their development is likely to 
be in part (indeed, in large part) determined by prior living standards, since parents 
influence children from birth (and even before – the impacts of inadequate nutrition or 
smoking during pregnancy, or foetal alcohol syndrome, on children’s development are 
obvious manifestations of this).  
It is further assumed that L is composed of material and non-material factors. But 
whereas children can be theoretically ranked on O (for example, proficiency in 
Mandarin) in terms of how they perform, standards of living necessary to achieve 
fullest potential in any outcome are not known – this depends on potentially 
unobserved talents and preferences. Herein lies a dilemma: Fullest potential in 
outcome O can be assumed to be achieved for child i with characteristics Z when her 
living standards L are maximised. However, Li can only be defined in terms of its 
17 
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efficacy in increasing Oi. The definition and level of L that produces the highest level 
of O is the definition and level of L that is adequate for children to develop to their 
fullest potential. 
This is essentially a re-working of a problem that Brighouse and Unterhalter perceive 
in Pogge’s critique of capabilities – that in order to determine whether a person’s 
rights to a certain level of resources (broadly defined) are fulfilled, it is necessary to 
examine their level of functioning, either in absolute terms, or in relation to the 
functioning of significant others (Brighouse and Unterhalter, 2008). It is assumed here 
that the child’s living standard is the only factor that matters in determining the 
outcome of interest, and that the main focus of policy interventions to fulfil children’s 
rights to development should be on living standards (supporting capabilities), not 
outcomes (functionings). The derivation of a definition of living standard L that is 
most strongly associated with the outcome of interest O is an iterative process, based 
on both existing knowledge about the determinants of given outcomes, and on 
experimentation. Some weakening of this assumption is allowed only in the case of 
children with specified conditions (for example, a disability) where society agrees that 
extra resource inputs are necessary (that is, where x>1). 
Moving towards equality in living standards 
Figure 2 provides a stylised representation of the child’s living standards and her 
development to her fullest potential. The horizontal axis of the Figure represents a 
quantifiable definition of Standard of Living where high values produce the most 
optimal developmental achievements, on average, while the vertical axis represents a 
quantifiable score of a child’s development achievement or outcome (for example in a 
particular space of physical, cognitive, or social and emotional development, to name 
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three developmental areas with which child development experts have been especially 
concerned). The line BY represents the gradient of child developmental outcome 
scores at about the 10th percentile for children with low and high standards of living, 
respectively. The line AX represents the gradient of child developmental outcome 
scores at about the 90th percentile. It is assumed that all children along the lines BY 
and AX have the same Z, and the only factor differentiating them is their standard of 
living. The ranges AB and XY can be seen as representing the influence of Z on O, 
controlling for L, while the gradients AX and BY can be seen as representing the 
influence of L on O, controlling for Z.  
The child’s right to a living standard adequate for her development to her fullest 
potential should involve the equalisation of inputs (reduction of the gap between ‘low’ 
and ‘high’ living standards on Figure 2), where these inputs are clearly seen to be 
associated with outcomes (Pogge, 2002, 2008). Equalisation of inputs can be justified 
on the grounds that unequal living standards – the product of a particular set of socio-
economic arrangements – are inhibiting some children from achieving their 
universally accepted right to develop to their fullest potential. Societies are therefore 
obliged to change those arrangements (or alternatively change the outcomes that 
matter) so that all children have the opportunity to achieve at the highest level 
possible for them, given their ‘natural’ endowments. The reduction of inequalities 
therefore follows a lexical ordering: the first priority of duty bearers is to equalise 
living standards among children, allowing for differential inputs only in the case of 
specified conditions. Once a satisfactory degree of equalisation has occurred (and this 
is a matter for public debate and social choice) then duty bearers can consider ways of 
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reducing inequalities among children with similar living standards but different 
outcomes. 
Figure 2 Model of development to fullest potential for children with low and high 
standards of living 
Standard of living (L)low high
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ild
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m
e 
(O
)
low
high P90 within high 
living std group
P10 within high 
living std group
P90 
within 
low living 
std group
P10 
within 
low living 
std group
A
B1
B
X
Y
A1
 
Note: The black line shows the gradient between the 90th percentile outcome score for children with 
low living standards and the 90th percentile outcome score for children with high living standards. The 
grey line shows the gradient between 10th percentile outcome scores for children with low and high 
living standards. The dashed lines show how the distribution of scores would have to be truncated if all 
children’s outcome scores were to approach those achieved by children with high living standards. In 
other words, the score at A would have to reach A1 and beyond (all the way towards X), and the score at 
B would have to reach B1 and beyond (all the way towards Y). This diagram therefore assumes that 
fullest potential for all children will only be attained when the majority of children’s outcome scores lie 
in the range XY. 
 
The range AB on Figure 2 does not represent fullest potential, since children with low 
living standards who scored in the range AB could clearly do better if their living 
standards improved. XY on the other hand could be seen as representing fullest 
potential (in a given society or community context), since this is what children with 
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high living standards achieve. X represents a better absolute developmental outcome 
than A, and Y represents a better absolute developmental outcome than B. The 
assumption is that given progressive equalisation in living standards, the slopes AX 
and BY should truncate, with children at A ultimately reaching an outcome at A1 and 
beyond, and children at B ultimately reaching an outcome at B1 and beyond (all the 
way to X and Y, respectively, at which point all children’s rights to an adequate living 
standard are, on average, fulfilled, or the distribution is recalibrated). There is still 
considerable heterogeneity among children in terms of any outcome, but this is no 
longer associated with their living standards, but with Z, their ‘natural’ endowments 
and propensities.  
5  But is  i t  ac tual ly  possi ble f or  every  chi ld to  have 
a  living s tandard adequa te f o r  achi evement o f  h er 
ful les t  po tential ?  
The approach proposed in this paper for fulfilling children’s right to a living standard 
adequate for their development to their fullest potential involves making progress 
towards the equalisation of children’s living standards with extra compensation for 
some identified conditions that are seen to impact on children’s opportunities to 
develop. This approach encompasses a clear value choice to focus on the distribution 
of inputs rather than of outcomes or capabilities. This approach is justified in part by 
the wording of the CRC – that children have a right to a living standard adequate for 
their development; the right here is to the input – the living standard. The approach is 
also justified in that a considerable amount of research shows that children’s 
developmental outcomes are greatly influenced by those things which are included in 
living standards for the purposes of this analysis: not only material resources, but also 
inputs from and interactions with parents and families, and communities and 
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institutions; that is, capital in all its forms (Bourdieu, 1986). Progress towards 
equalising these inputs would go a long way towards children’s greater achievement 
of their fullest potential. 
Would it be enough? The work of Peirre Bourdieu attempts to explain relative 
immobility in class structures in postwar France through analysis of how the elite not 
only controls the levers for advancement, but also adjusts them in order to ensure that 
it maintains its competitive advantage over time, thus cementing its position at the top 
through generations even in the face of apparently egalitarian policies that aim to 
open up educational and other opportunities (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986; Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1990). Annette Lareau succinctly sums up Bourdieu’s ideas on 
socialisation: depending on their social origin, people are socialised differently. This 
process of socialization provides children and adults with a sense of what is ‘natural’ 
(he terms this habitus). Socialisation also determines the resources (capital – social, 
economic and cultural) that people inherit and can draw upon in their confrontations 
with different institutions (fields) in society (Lareau, 2003, p.275). 
In other words, parents of different social classes interact differently with their 
children, and with the outside world. These patterns of interaction are partly brought 
about by what the actors are comfortable with, akin to the concept of adaptive 
preference that is discussed at length in the capabilities approach (Bourdieu, 1986). 
But Bourdieu’s theory further suggests that they are also partly associated with 
explicit agency on the part of the actors in pursuit of a specific goal. The elite 
maintains its position in a number of ways. First, the elite defines success and taste, 
and “art and cultural consumption are predisposed, consciously and deliberately or 
not, to fulfill a social function of legitimating social differences.” (Bourdieu, 1984, 
22 
 
                  Fullest potential 
p.7) Second, as Lareau shows in her ethnographic study of class inequality in the US, 
habitus and capital possessed by the elite are attuned to the criteria for successful 
encounters with official institutions, such as schools, employers and state 
bureaucracies; they are also attuned to the criteria for their children’s economic and 
social success in the wider world. The elite maintains its position, partly because it 
simply acts out of habitus, but also because it actively competes to do so. The lower 
class on the other hand maintains its position because it possesses different types of 
habitus and capital which are less well attuned to their children’s economic success, 
or to negotiating their way through official and other institutions. The habitus and 
capital of the lower class are less well attuned to these things because it is the elite 
that makes the rules, and changes them, to maintain its position. In other words, the 
assumption of cultural neutrality of institutions such as schools is false – they are on 
the side of the elite, even to the extent that a formal educational qualification is less a 
signal of a specific set of knowledge than of “capacity to adopt the aesthetic 
disposition” associated with that qualification (Bourdieu, 1984, p.28). 
Bourdieu’s ideas have been widely used to explain the perpetuation of differences in 
educational outcomes across social classes (Lareau, 2003). In common with other 
Marxist analysts, he has undergone criticism because his theory tends to explain the 
stability of social class formations across generations, but fails to explain social 
change; and also because the actions of parents and their children at particular 
junctures in the education system may not simply be the result of habitus or a given 
set of cultural capital, but could equally be seen as a rational choice for the actors 
involved (Hatcher, 1998). Nonetheless, Bourdieu’s theory is relevant to this paper not 
so much in terms of explaining class immobility as in explaining the competitive 
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actions of the elite to maintain its position through generations, committing ‘symbolic 
violence’ on non-elites in the process. Bourdieu’s analysis resonates with Pogge’s 
(2008) emphasis on the negative obligation of duty bearers – to desist from using their 
accumulated capital to maintain their elite status, and level the intergenerational 
mobility playing field. 
This is a tall order. Bourdieu argues that the capital that parents accumulate and pass 
to their children comes in three forms – economic, social, and cultural. It is difficult to 
imagine a world where the transfer of such capital from parents to children did not 
exist, for this would be a world played according to the rules of roulette, … 
… a world without inertia, without accumulation, without heredity 
or acquired properties, in which every moment is perfectly 
independent of the previous one, every soldier has a marshal’s baton 
in his knapsack, and every prize can be attained, instantaneously, by 
everyone, so that at each moment anyone can become anything. 
(Bourdieu, 1986, p.241) 
Social structure embodies capital, and societies cannot be easily organised according 
to the rules of roulette. But additionally, for the human rights advocate, parents are 
duty bearers for their children. In this sense, they are obliged to support their 
children’s development. Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift argue on the one hand that 
parent-child relationships have a particular specificity that demands partial treatment 
as they are essential for human flourishing. On the other hand, in common with 
Bourdieu, they also suggest that parental partiality towards children has distributional 
consequences, which raises questions about the extent to which societies should 
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permit parents to contribute to flourishing in their own children, and how flourishing 
should be distributed among all children (Brighouse and Swift, 2009, p.47). 
Brighouse and Swift place considerable emphasis on the centrality of parent-child 
relationships, stating that a society with plentiful family relationships and high levels 
of inequality would be preferable to a society where levels of inequality are low but 
family relationships are scarce. However, they seek to place bounds on the impact of 
these relationships on wider inequalities in society by proposing that parents should 
be free to read bedtime stories to their children and send them to religious instruction, 
but not ncessarily free to send them to elite educational institutions. Nonetheless, as 
Bourdieu’s thesis suggests (and as Lareau, 2003, shows with her analysis of ‘moments 
of social and cultural reproduction’), “(t)he family, even when kept within its 
genuinely valuable bounds, seems to be more threatening to the prospects for equality 
of opportunity, even of the conventional kind, than social democrats had hoped.” 
(Brighouse and Swift, 2009, p.59)  
In other words, even bedtime stories can serve to differentiate children. What hope for 
increased equality of resources (of which bedtime stories are one component) between 
children? Brighouse and Swift (2009) do not offer any specific solution to this 
problem, other than giving priority to antipoverty measures. Yet the agency of parents 
is surely important in another sense that is central to the idea of ‘fullest potential’. In 
reading bedtime stories to their children, in sending them to elite schools, in engaging 
with them in original and creative ways, parents are pushing back the boundaries of 
fullest potential and developing new standards to which all children should perhaps 
have the right to aspire.  
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It is difficult to imagine the state with its (formally) egalitarian project, achieving new 
heights in ‘fullest potential’. Rather, the aspirations in Articles 27 and 29 of the CRC 
could perhaps be better served with a triple policy approach that first, allows parents 
the freedom to develop their children to their fullest potential; second, strives to 
reform the institutions that it controls (not least, the education system) so that 
inequalities between people in terms of how they interact with these institutions are 
minimised; and third, engages in continued resource transfers between families with 
higher and lower living standards, with a focus on only on the material, but also a 
wider range of resources that has been shown by research to make a difference to 
children’s lives and opportunities. Societies can shake things up every so often by 
rewriting the rules of social advancement (another word for revolution), but 
permanent revolution, where life becomes more like a game of roulette, as Bourdieu 
puts it, seems an unpromising basis on which to offer children living standards 
adequate for their development to their fullest potential. 
6  Conclus ion 
In this article a rigorous interpretation of children’s right to development to their 
fullest potential is proposed. The rights aspect is important – it suggests that countries 
that have ratified the CRC need to consider how to interpret ‘fullest potential’ and 
how to put policies in place that enable children to achieve it. This understanding 
suggests that policy should constantly reinforce its efforts to reduce inequalities in 
living standards (broadly interpreted) among children, so that ‘natural’ abilities and 
preferences rather than living standards determine children’s developmental 
outcomes. However, it is only through examination of actual capabilities or 
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achievements that we can tell which children’s living standards are adequate to the 
task. 
The achievement of fullest potential for all children (even within the narrow bounds 
of formal education) assumes that different children will be interested in, and excel at, 
different things, but that there is nonetheless a distribution in all outcomes. Fullest 
potential does not mean the same level of achievement in all outcomes for every 
child. It means that all children have sufficient (material and non-material) resources 
and living standards to have the opportunity to achieve to their fullest potential.  
However, reduction of inequalities in living standards on its own is not enough. A 
society (or state) that weighs heavily on parents and children in order to achieve 
equality of living standards may not be one that is best at encouraging excellence. 
Thus there exists a tension between every child’s right to a standard of living adequate 
for their development (to their fullest potential) and the meaning of fullest potential 
itself. This tension is not merely abstract, but reveals itself in government policy 
statements (for example on education) that appear to pay lip-service to both, but may 
in practice prioritise one over the other. Elaboration of the concept of fullest potential 
can help in understanding tensions in policy aims and societal choices. More research 
on this tension, and on how the actual delivery of services such as education can 
mitigate it, is needed.  
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